Bath Iron Works Corporation Ordered To Award Claimant Permanent and Total Disability Benefits (ALJ McGrath)

Ronald A. Marsters v. Bath Iron Works Corporation
Read Full Decision Here

Excerpts

Claimant testified he sustained a gradual work injury to his back up through April 19, 2005. He remembers having intermittent pain so he sought treatment from his personal physician who then referred him to see Dr. Susan Hage at Medical Rehabilitation Associates. His initial visit with Dr. Hage was on May 25, 2005. An MRI was scheduled and that is when the cause of his problems became evident.

He testified that the April 2005 injury to his back was a gradual injury caused by many years of heavy lifting and very physical work. Claimant testified his work included climbing up ladders, working on saw horses, heavy lifting, twisting, being in awkward positions and brutal physical labor. TR at 15. He testified that he has had treatment, including cortisone shots in order to function. After the injury he returned to work at BIW where he was subject to limitations because of his back problem. He was limited in his ability to sit and stand for no more than 20 minutes at a time, and could only kneel, bend and climb as he could tolerate. He testified that BIW was aware of the back problems because his supervisors tried to accommodate him and BIW was paying for the medical treatment and his lost time from work. TR 16.

On March 27, 2006 Claimant sustained a traumatic injury to his left shoulder. That injury occurred when he was working overhead installing a vent line and the stepladder he was standing on kicked out, causing him to fall backwards. Claimant put his left arm up to break his backwards fall, his arm got caught in the bulkhead and he severely damaged his shoulder. He testified he "ripped three of the four ligaments—one right off the bone and two just tore apart.” TR at 17. He was diagnosed with a rotator cuff injury and underwent surgical repair on April 27, 2006. TR at 18; EX 33 at 425, 426; EX 36 at 441.

Conclusion

The Claimant seeks an award of permanent total disability benefits from April 18, 2008 though the present and continuing. The Employer seeks to invoke Section 8(f) relief, and that request is joined in by the Claimant. Upon review of the parties’ stipulations and the evidence of record, I conclude the Claimant is entitled to an award of permanent and total disability compensation beginning on April 18, 2008 to the present and continuing. I further conclude the Employer is entitled to relief from liability pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act. My findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.

Longshore 101 Part 1

This is part one of Longshore 101, a conference that we did in Chicago for Signal Mutual Indemnity Association.  It is in Prezi format so you just keep clicking forward.  Unfortunately - or perhaps fortunately for you - the original presentation was accompanied by a live narrative.   Enjoy.  Subsequent sections of Longshore 101 follow.

Longshore 101 Prezi - Jurisdiction

ALJ BERLIN ORDERS COMPANY TO PAY CLAIMANT BENEFITS

ROLAND MEZA V. VOPAK NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Read Full Decision Here

Excerpts

This matter arises under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (“the Act”), 33 U.S.C. §901, et seq. Claimant alleges that he is permanently partially disabled as a result of a covered workplace injury. He rates his retained earning capacity at $200 per week based on actual earnings. Employer/Carrier believes that Claimant is capable of earning more. There also is a dispute about Claimant’s need for continued medical care

Claimant Roland Meza is forty-nine years old. He did not complete high school but earned a

General Education Development (GED) certificate and did about one semester's credit hours of community college work. Tr. 23; C.Ex. 28 at 86. Before beginning as a longshore worker in 1998, he had fifteen years’ experience as a pipefitter/crane operator/lead as well as experience as a laborer in the petrochemical industry, a helicopter repairman in the U.S. Army Reserve, a machine operator, and a rigger operator. Tr. 24-26. His longshore work for Employer Vopak was as a maintenance worker and then as a terminal operator, which he was doing at the time of injury on August 9, 2004. Id. His responsibilities included tying up vessels, ships, and barges; hooking up hoses and arms off the vessels; climbing ladders; and turning valves. Id. He also did safety-related paperwork. Tr. 53-58. On August 9, 2004, Claimant backed a front-end loader into a steel pole while at work. E.Ex. 4 at 18-20. 21.

Conclusion

Claimant sustained a compensable injury while working for Employer in August 2004. He

might have sustained an aggravation of that injury when he returned to his job. He lost wages

incurred medical expenses, and is likely to incur future medical expenses by reason of the resulting disability. Employer/Carrier is liable for these benefits.

ALJ MALAMPHY AWARDS CLAIMANT WITH TEMPORARY PARTIAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS AND TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS

MELVIN P. COOPER V. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING

READ FULL DECISION HERE

Excerpts

The Claimant’s duties as a ship fitter involved fitting materials for welding, drilling, and

grinding onboard vessels. (TR 15). The work involved a lot of crawling, and the Claimantdeveloped knee problems in April of 2008. (TR 15-16). The Claimant testified he reported his knee pain to the shipyard clinic and after being given a choice of physicians, he went to see Dr. Hubbard in Elizabeth City. (TR 16). The Claimant testified that Dr. Hubbard performed a total knee replacement of his left knee on July 2, 2008. (TR 16). However, the pain did not subside and was followed up by another surgery (arthroscopy) in December of 2009, which also did not alleviate the pain. (TR17). Dr. Hubbard referred the Claimant to Dr. Hines, who prescribed pain medication and physical therapy for the Claimant and, when the pain continued, referred him to Dr. Bevilacqua (TR 17). It was at about this time that the Claimant began to experience issues in his left hip (though his hip issues were unrelated to his knee injury). (TR 17-18).

Employer relies on Dr. Hubbard’s setting of permanent work restrictions on July 23,2009 to support its contention that Claimant reached maximum medical improvement on that date. However, no documentation authored by Dr. Hubbard was submitted into evidenceshowing Dr. Hubbard’s assignment of work restrictions on that date

Conclusion

The medical opinion evidence submitted supports a finding that Claimant’s ongoing knee

problems since his first knee replacement were due to an infection that resulted from that surgery. The infection and the failure of the first knee surgery to repair his knee due to his work related injury prolonged Claimant’s recovery, resulting in a continued period of temporary disability.

Based on the foregoing, I find the medical evidence does not support a finding of maximum medical improvement. No doctor has opined that Claimant reached maximum medical improvement, and his records and testimony show continued treatment that has improved his condition and continues to do so.

dark Harbor

dark Harbor  An interesting site about the old New York waterfront....

A friend of the old waterfront, Joseph Sciorra (of Queens College’s John D. Calandra Italian American Institute), was entrusted several years ago with a cassette tape of a rare old Frank Sinatra 78 rpm recording. He recently posted it on YouTube: Forty-eight seconds of the great singer in his prime, making a scratchily sincere endorsement for the anti-Mob candidate for Congress in Red Hook in 1946. Vincent ‘Jim’ Longhi was a young waterfront lawyer just back from the war that fall that the Sinatra booster record played from trucks all over Brooklyn’s 12^th district on his behalf.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yd1OKRvzaIo

Longhi was thirty years old when he dared to run for congress in an anti-Mafia campaign. The Democratic candidate backed by the Camarda clan was traditionally a lock, leaving the forlorn Republican nomination wide open for Longhi, whose politics were closer to the leftist American Labor Party, which would also endorse him. “Since ninety percent of the workers on the Brooklyn waterfront were Italian,” he told me sixty years later, “and I’m an articulate young Italian about to be a lawyer, we could capture the Republican nomination, and we did.” It was a sign of how close a Republican majority finally seemed in 1946 that New York party leaders tolerated candidates as left-leaning as Longhi, who found “hundreds of longshoremen who remembered and worked with [martyred longshore leader] Pete Panto who thought, ‘Someday we’ll get the Mob out of there.’ They became my campaign workers. The campaign and the struggle against the Mob rackets became synonymous.” more .. dark Harbor

WorkersCompensation.com CompNewsNetwork - Brokers and Agents Beware - WC is the Leader in E&O Claims

WorkersCompensation.com CompNewsNetwork - Brokers and Agents Beware - WC is the Leader in E&O Claims

Longshoreman Protest Use Of Non-Union Labor at Cruise Ship Docks | Juneau Empire - Alaska's Capital City Online Newspaper

Longshoreman continue protesting at cruise ship docks | Juneau Empire - Alaska's Capital City Online Newspaper

Another Confounder in Lung Cancer Occupational Epidemiology -- Diesel Engine Fumes | Schachtman Law

Another Confounder in Lung Cancer Occupational Epidemiology -- Diesel Engine Fumes | Schachtman Law

CLAIMANT DENIED BENEFITS (ALJ PRICE)

Kenneth Little v. C & G Welding
Read Full Decision Here


Excerpts

The Parties agree that 1) Claimant allegedly injured his low back on May 14, 2009; 2) there was an employer/employee relationship at the time of the injury; 3) the employer was timely notified of the injury; 4) the claim was timely filed; 5) the notice of controversion was timely filed; 6) the informal conference was held on May 25, 2010; 7) compensation has been previously paid; 8) medical benefits in the amount of $45,192.64 have been paid; and 8) Claimant has not returned to his job. (ALJ-1).

The issues for the Court to decide are 1) whether Claimant’s injury or disability rose from his employment; 2) average weekly wage (AWW); 3) entitlement to benefits; and 4) entitlementto attorney’s fees. (ALJ-1).

Claimant testified at the formal hearing on March 19, 2012. Before the 2009 accident, Claimant worked as a welder, helper, and an offshore rigger for three or four years, first for Curtis Callais, Employer. (Tr. 23). He applied to work there in 2006, and went for a preemployment physical at OMS with Dr. Davis. (Tr. 24). In 2006, Claimant testified he was doing welding assembly and rigging jobs offshore.

Conclusion

Importantly, Dr. Shults noted that for an accurate diagnosis of causation, an accurate history from the patient is necessary; it is clear from the record that Claimant was not truthful with Dr. Shults or Dr. Davis about his preexisting back injury. Therefore, there is nothing shown in the record to connect Claimant’s back injury and 2010 surgery with any accident in 2009.

Due to Claimant’s testimony, and that of Curtis Callais, I found that Claimant was unableto establish the 20(a) presumption in this case. Moreover, based on his prior back issues and the

medical record, I find that Claimant has failed to prove he experienced a work accident on May 14, 2009, which could have caused or aggravated his lumbar condition.

Capitol Lookout: Yacht stigma clouds marine industry interests

Capitol Lookout: Yacht stigma clouds marine industry interests

AMA 6th Study Doesn't Answer the Big Question

WorkCompCentral® | Workers Compensation Information, News, Training and More!

AMA 6th Study Doesn't Answer the Big Questionposted on 07/23/2012

David J. DePaolo

An interesting thing happened when three states migrated to the Sixth Ed. of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment - the average impairment ratings declined.

That is what the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) reported on Wednesday.

Impairment ratings for injured workers dropped significantly in Montana, New Mexico and Tennessee after they switched to the Sixth Edition NCCI found.

The study also compared some changes to impairment ratings in Georgia and Kentucky, which are continuing use of the AMA fifth edition.

NCCI found a direct correlation between ratings declines and use of the sixth edition in New Mexico, Montana and Tennessee. But there were also some declines in Georgia and Kentucky which NCCI attributes to other factors including the economy and law changes.

"While the impact of and the direction of the changes in Kentucky and Georgia are worth noting, the mere presence of change itself has an impact on average impairment ratings from factors unrelated to which edition of the AMA guides was used to determine impairment," NCCI said in the report.

For the three states examined, NCCI found:

• In Montana, whole-body impairment ratings dropped by an average of 28% when comparing workers who reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) during accident years 2006-2007 and those who reached MMI during 2008 or 2009.
• In New Mexico, whole-body impairment ratings dropped by 32% and impairment ratings for individual body part dropped by 6% for workers who reached MMI during 2008 and 2009, compared to those who reached MMI during accident years 2006-2007.
• Average whole-body impairments dropped by 25% and impairments for individual body parts dropped by an average of 16% in Tennessee for workers who reached MMI in 2008 or 2009, compared to those who reached MMI in 2006-2007.

The Sixth Edition generated much controversy when it was introduced. The AMA released the tome at the end of a year that caused an uproar in some states because they had statutes that required an automatic conversion to the new edition - but there was insufficient time for the adoption process so legal and legislative maneuvers ensued to retard the adoption process in those states.

In addition many observed that there would be significant reduction in ratings - and of course it turns out that they were correct. This would not necessarily pose a problem for those states that have formulas to adjust impairment ratings to disability ratings (the former describes "whole person" bodily function, the later describes the financial affect). But those states that dont have a conversion system and translate an impairment directly into money essentially discriminate against workers injured after the adoption date of the 6th.

The sixth edition of the AMA guides is used in 12 states and for the administration of the U.S. Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act: Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Wyoming.

How those states use the guides however is dramatically different from state to state.

The biggest driving factor of the sixth edition from prior editions is the attempt to make ratings as predictable and stable as possible so that injuries generate the same rating across the nation regardless of where, when, how, who and what.

In my opinion, while the NCCI reports the obvious and predictable, what NCCI should really study (if possible) is whether adoption of the sixth edition resulted in more consistency in impairment ratings. 

The issue isnt how much money an impairment rating generates that can be adjusted by the conversion to a disability rating. 

The issue is whether a back injury in Alaska generates the same impairment rating as a back injury in Wyoming. If that is the case, then the sixth edition accomplishes its goal and legislatures can adjust now much money an impairment is worth.

While NCCIs study is interesting, it is not terribly relevant.

David J. DePaolo is founder, chief executive officer and editor-in-chief of WorkCompCentral.

Insurance News - House Small Business Subcommittee on Investigations, Oversight and Regulations Hearing

Kristina Hebert, President of the Marine Industries Association of South Florida. testifying before House Small Business Subcommittee today on behalf of this association and the United States Superyacht Association. Oversight and Regulation

Insurance News - House Small Business Subcommittee on Investigations, Oversight and Regulations Hearing

Longshoremen: Port dispute about more than two jobs - Portland Business Journal

Longshoremen: Port dispute about more than two jobs - Portland Business Journal

The Longshore Act; A Complete Survey of Longshore Act Jurisdiction

Click Here to Go to our Website

STATE BY STATE SURVEY OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

1. Alabama – Concurrent jurisdiction.

2. Alaska – Concurrent jurisdiction.

3. Arizona – Unknown.

4. Arkansas – Unknown.

5. California – Concurrent jurisdiction.

6. Colorado – Unknown.

7. Connecticut – Concurrent jurisdiction. Coppola v. Logistec Connecticut,

Inc., 283 Conn. 1, 925 A.2d 257 (2007).

8. Delaware – Concurrent jurisdiction.

9. District of Columbia - Exclusive jurisdiction.

10. Florida – Exclusive jurisdiction.

11. Georgia – Concurrent jurisdiction.

12. Hawaii – Exclusive jurisdiction.

13. Idaho – Unknown.

14. Illinois – Concurrent jurisdiction for “twilight zone” cases only. Uphold v. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (National Maintenance & Repair), 385 Ill. App.3d 567, 896 N.E.2d 828 (Ill. App. 5^th District, 2008)(no state jurisdiction for injuries occurring upon navigable waters).

15. Indiana – Unknown.

16. Iowa – Concurrent jurisdiction.

17. Kansas – Unknown.

18. Kentucky – Exclusive jurisdiction. KRS 342.650(4)(“Any person for whom a rule of liability for injury or death is provided by the laws of the United States.”). See also, Morris v. Owensboro Grain Co., LLC, No. 2011-CA-000924-WC (Ky Court of Appeals, June 22, 2012)(unpublished).

19. Louisiana – Exclusive jurisdiction. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1035.2 (“No compensation shall be payable in respect to the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, or any of its extensions, or the Jones Act.”).

20. Maine – Concurrent jurisdiction.

21. Maryland - Exclusive provided employee is “eligible under a federal law” and is not engaged in “clearly distinguishable and separable” intrastate commerce. Md. Labor and Employment Code Ann. § 9-223.

22. Massachusetts – Concurrent jurisdiction.

23. Michigan – Concurrent jurisdiction.

24. Minnesota – Concurrent jurisdiction.

25. Mississippi – Exclusive Jurisdiction. Miss. Code. Ann. § 71-3-5 (“This chapter shall not apply to transportation and maritime employments for which a rule of liability is provided by the laws of the United States.”).

26. Missouri - Exclusive jurisdiction.

27. Montana – Unknown.

28. Nebraska – Concurrent jurisdiction.

29. Nevada – Unknown.

30. New Hampshire – Unknown.

31. New Jersey - Exclusive jurisdiction. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-36 (“Employer" is declared to be synonymous with master, and includes natural persons, partnerships, and corporations; "employee" is synonymous with servant, and includes all natural persons, including officers of corporations, who perform service for an employer for financial consideration, exclusive of (1) employees eligible under the federal ‘Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,’ 44 Stat. 1424 (33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.), for benefits payable with respect to accidental death or injury, or occupational disease or infection . . .).

32. New Mexico – Unknown.

33. New York – Concurrent jurisdiction but subject to waiver under NY CLS Work. Comp. § 113 (“The provisions of this chapter shall apply to employers and employees engaged in intrastate, and also interstate or foreign commerce, for whom a rule of liability or method of compensation has been or may be established by the congress of the United States, only to the extent that their mutual connection with intrastate work may and shall be clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign commerce, provided that awards according to the provisions of this chapter may be made by the board in respect of injuries subject to the admiralty or other federal laws in case the claimant, the employer and the insurance carrier waive their admiralty or interstate commerce rights and remedies, and the state insurance fund or other insurance carrier may assume liability for the payment of such awards under this chapter.)” See Rodriguez v. Reicon Group, LLC, 2010 NY Slip Op 7442; 2010 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7528 (NY Sup. Ct. 3rd, October 21, 2010).

34. North Carolina – Concurrent jurisdiction.

35. North Dakota – Unknown.

36. Ohio – Exclusive jurisdiction as of September 22, 2008. Ohio Labor Code § 4123.54(I) (“If an employee who is covered under the federal ‘Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,’ 98 Stat. 1639, 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq., is injured or contracts an occupational disease or dies as a result of an injury or occupational disease, and if that employee's or that employee's dependents' claim for compensation or benefits for that injury, occupational disease, or death is subject to the jurisdiction of that act, the employee or the employee's dependents are not entitled to apply for and shall not receive compensation or benefits under this chapter and Chapter 4121 of the Revised Code. The rights of such an employee and the employee's dependents under the federal ‘Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,’ 98 Stat. 1639, 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq., are the exclusive remedy against the employer for that injury, occupational disease, or death.). Effective 9/22/08.

37. Oklahoma – Unknown.

38. Oregon – Exclusive jurisdiction. Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.027(4)(excludes “A person for whom a rule of liability or injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment as provided by the laws of the United States.”).

39. Pennsylvania – Concurrent jurisdiction for “twilight zone” cases. Wellsville Terminals Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Zacharias), 632 A.2d 1305 (Pa. 1993)(exclusive jurisdiction for injuries occurring on navigable waters); & McElheney v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal (Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard), 940 A.2d 351 (Pa. 2008)(concurrent jurisdiction for injury occurring in dry dock).

40. Rhode Island – Concurrent jurisdiction.

41. South Carolina – Concurrent jurisdiction.

42. South Dakota – Unknown.

43. Tennessee – Concurrent jurisdiction.

44. Texas – Exclusive jurisdiction. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.091(a)(2), excluding “a person covered by a method of compensation established under federal law.”

45. Utah – Unknown.

46. Vermont – Unknown.

47. Virginia – Exclusive jurisdiction. §65.2-101 of the Code of Virginia excluding “Any person who suffers an injury [on or after July 1, 2012,] for which there is jurisdiction under either the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., and its extensions, or the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq. However, this title shall not be construed to eliminate or diminish any right that any person or, in the case of the person's death, his personal representative, may have under either the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., and its extensions, or the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq.”

48. Washington – Exclusive jurisdiction. Wash. Rev. Code § 51.12.100(1)(“Except as otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of this title shall not apply to a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or to employers and workers for whom a right or obligation exists under the maritime laws or federal employees' compensation act for personal injuries or death of such workers.”).

49. West Virginia – Unknown.

50. Wisconsin – Concurrent jurisdiction.

51. Wyoming – Unknown. rights reserved.

CLAIMANT AWARDED TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION (ALJ GEE)

SANTIAGO LUNA v.IMIA and SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION
Read Full Decision Here

Excerpts

On September 7, 2006, the Claimant was working for the Employer at NASSCO. (HT, p.39.) He was working on a scaffold preparing the area on a ship for painters with a buffer. He was crawling on the scaffold when one of the boards fell, causing the Claimant to fall. (HT, p. 26; EX 2; EX 3; EX 19, pp. 49-50.) He fell approximately 21 feet hitting another scaffold and then landing on the ground. (HT, pp. 26, 28; EX 2; EX 3.) He lost consciousness but regained consciousness when the paramedics were moving him. When he woke, he felt pain in his ribs, right shoulder, and the right side of his neck. (HT, p. 27.) He sustained rib fractures and a scapula fracture and hurt his right elbow, neck, and right shoulder in the fall. (HT, pp. 27-28.)

Conclusion

In conclusion, I find that the Claimant suffered a right scapular fracture, multiple rib fractures, an elbow contusion, and a right cervical strain as a result of his September 7, 2006, fall. These injuries were work-related. The Claimant was temporarily totally disabled from September 7, 2006, until October 26, 2006, when he returned to modified duty with no loss in pay. He was terminated on June 8, 2007, for failing to provide the Employer with a valid Social Security number. The Claimant reached maximum medical improvement on September 17, 2007, and was able to return to his former job when he reached maximum medical improvement. He had no permanent disability, partial or total, after he reached maximum medical improvement

ALJ McGRATH ORDERS ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION TO PAY CLAIMANT TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION

JOSEPH W. COURCHAINE v. ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION
Read Full Decision Here

Excerpts

To recover under the Act, Mr. Courchaine must demonstrate causation, in that his injury arose out of his employment with Electric Boat Section 20(a) of the Act “creates a presumption that a claim for compensation comes within the provisions of the Act” and “inherent in this provision is the presumption that an injury is causally related to a worker’s employment.” Rainey v. Dir., OWCP, 517 F.3d 632, 634 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Port Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Hunter, 227 F.3d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 2000)). In order to invoke the Section 20(a) presumption “[t]he claimant must make out a prima facie case by showing (1) that he suffered physical harm and (2) workplace conditions could have caused, aggravated, or accelerated the harm.” Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Fields, 599 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Am Stevedoring Ltd. v. Marinelli, 248 F.3d 54, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2001)). “[T]he aggravation rule does not require that a later injury fundamentally alter a prior condition. It is enough that it produces or contributes to a worsening of symptoms.” Rainey, 517 F.3d at 636 (citing Marinette Marine Corp. v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 431 F.3d 1032, 1035 (7th Cir. 2005)); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Preston,  380 F.3d 597, 605 (1st Cir. 2004).

In the case at hand, Mr. Courchaine has provided sufficient evidence to establish his prima facie case to successfully invoke the Section 20(a) presumption. It is agreed by both parties that Mr. Courchaine suffers from the degenerative disease of osteoarthritis. Er. Br. at 3. According to his testimony, which is supported by the“General Dynamics Physical Task Analysis” form, Mr. Courchaine’s job as a grinder required him to frequently perform physical tasks, such as crawling, climbing stairs and ladders, and squatting. CX-4; EX-8-11, at 41; HT at 43-44. Mr. Courchaine also testified that as a result of this level of activity his right hip wouldhurt more at the end of his shift than it had at the beginning. HT at 62. Mr. Courchaine’s testimony of how he felt at the end of his work day is supported by the medical opinions of both Dr. Glenney and Dr. Gaccione, who agreenature of Mr. Courchaine’s work as a grinder would intensify his pain symptoms. EX-2, at 26; EX-6, at 21. As such, I find Mr. Courchaine has met his initial burden to show employment conditions existed at Electric Boat that could have further aggravated his condition.

Conclusion

The Claimant’s right hip osteoarthritis is compensable because I found his work at Electric Boat aggravated the pre-existing condition, therefore the entire resulting disability is compensable.See Rainey, 517 F.3d at 636; Blanchette v. OWCP, 998 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1993). Therefore, any medical expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred as a result of his right hip osteoarthritis are also compensable. 33 U.S.C. § 907;Dupre, 23 BRBS at 94.

The U.S. Economic Policy Debate Is a Sham - Bloomberg

The U.S. Economic Policy Debate Is a Sham - Bloomberg

Excellent editorial trying to insert a little reality into the political economic debate.

ALJ GERAGHTY AWARDS CLAIMANT PERMANENT AND PARTIAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION

DENNIS A. KEENER v. ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION and SENESCO, INC
Read Full Decision Here

Excerpts

The Claimant and Electric Boat offered the following stipulations: (1) the Longshore Act

applies to the claim; (2) there was an employer/employee relationship at the time of the injury;
(3) the claim was timely filed; (4) the notice of controversion was timely filed; (5) the average
weekly wage at the time of the injury at EB was $883.48; and (6) the informal conference was
held on March 2, 2011. CL & EB JX 1; see also TR 5-6.

Senesco stipulated to the following: (1) the Longshore Act applies to the claim; (2) the

informal conference was held on March 2, 2011. TR 7-9. The issues in dispute are: (1) whether the Claimant sustained an injury to his neck in the course of his employment at EB; (2) has any neck injury/condition been aggravated by Claimant’s employment at Senseco; and (3) the nature and extent of the disability.

Conclusion
As the presumption has been rebutted, I must now weigh all of the evidence to determine
whether the Claimant has established that his injury is causally related to his employment at
Electric Boat. The opinions of the medical experts Drs. Morgan and Willetts differ on this key
issue. After careful consideration, I credit the opinion of Dr. Willetts over that of Dr. Morgan.Dr. Willetts examined the Claimant on several occasions. He is familiar with Claimant’s work activities at Electric Boat. Moreover, Dr. Morgan’s discounting of Claimant’s work in which he repetitively snapped his neck forward to flip the face shield of his welding helmet down as a contributing factor in his degenerative disc disease is inconsistent with Dr. Morgan's testimony that the neck degeneration results from holding and moving the neck over time. Repeatedly snapping one’s neck forward to flip a welding shield down certainly qualifies as moving the neckover time, which Dr. Morgan views as contributing to the degenerative condition. Additionally,Dr. Morgan appears to ignore the effects of Claimant’s bumping his head numerous times onoverhead beams during his years at Electric Boat, whereas, Dr. Willetts explained that doing so puts significant force and stress on the neck. Accordingly, I find that Claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his cervical spine condition is causally related to his duties at
Electric Boat.

CLAIMANT AWARDED PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS (ALJ SOLOMON)

MARINA DOANE v. AAFES, FOR HOMESTEAD AFB
Read Full Decision Here

Excerpts

Claimant is seventy years of age. She graduated from high school in Greece. She has never received a subsequent degree or certification. She speaks with a pronounced Greek accent and according to the testimony, has trouble understanding English and being understood in English. Claimant utilizes a hearing aid in her left ear. She also uses a cane for stability which has been recommended by her treating physicians, Dr. Richard Glosser (orthopedic surgeon) and Dr. Todd Alea (pain management specialist). Claimant does not drive. Claimant was employed by Army Air Force Exchange Service. After coming to the United States in 2002, the only other job she held was as a housekeeper for a Greek gentleman. Claimant’s position with the Employer was as a stocking clerk. Her duties included heavy lifting and carrying and standing for long periods of time. TR 27-28. Claimant worked as a cashier for less than a month as it was immediately apparent to the Employer that Claimant did not have the training, experience, and skills to fulfill the position’s duties. TR 26-27. On February 28, 2008, at the PX, Claimant fell from a stepladder, injuring her left knee and back. On September 16, 2008, she injured her back again at the PX when stocking items. Both accidents have been accepted as compensable by Employer/Carrier. Claimant has been treated by Dr.Richard Glosser, board-certified orthopedic surgeon for her left knee, and Dr. Todd Alea, board-certified pain management specialist, for her back.

Conclusion

The Employer shall pay the Claimant permanent total disability (“PTD”) from December 13, 2010, to the present. The District Director shall enforce all items of stipulation entered by this decision. Although not specifically authorized in the Act, if applicable, it has been accepted practice that interest at the rate of six (6) percent per annum is assessed on all past due compensation benefits.  Avallone v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 10 BRBS 724 (1978).  The Employer shall receive a credit for all compensation already paid to the Claimant. The Employer shall continue to furnish the Claimant with such reasonable, appropriate and necessary medical care and treatment as the Claimant’s work-related injury referenced herein may require, subject to the provisions of section 7 of the Act.

ALJ CALIANOS AWARDS CLAIMANT PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY

ROBERT M. BLODGETT v. ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION
Read Full Decision Here

Excerpts

The parties have stipulated to the following facts: (1) The Act applies to this claim; (2)
Blodgett suffers from a lung injury; (3) The injury occurred at the Electric Boat Shipyard in
Groton, Connecticut; (4) The injury arose out of and in the course of Blodgett’s employment
with EBC; (5) There was an Employer/Employee relationship at the time of the injury; (6) The
Employer was timely notified of the injury; (7) The claim was timely filed; (8) The Notice of
Controversion was timely filed; (9) The Informal Conference was conducted on June 10, 2011;
and (10) Blodgett has not returned to his usual employment.  ALJX-7.
The remaining issues for my determination are Blodgett’s status as a voluntary retiree,
the extent of his disability, and his average weekly wage.  Upon consideration of the record as a
whole, I find that Blodgett is entitled to permanent and total disability compensation benefits and
medical benefits under the Act.

Conclusion

The Act provides that “[i]n case of total disability adjudged to be permanent 66 and 2/3’s
per centum of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance of
such total disability.”  33 U.S.C.  § 908(a).  Pursuant to section 8(a), Blodgett is entitled to two thirds his AWW of  $924.35, or $616.23 per week, from June 21, 2010 until the present and
continuing

ALJ DORSEY AWARDS CLAIMANT PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY

PATRICK GRIERSON v. MARINE TERMINALS CORPORATION & MAJESTIC 
INSURANCE CO. & TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE CO
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Excerpts

The lashing bar that struck Patrick Grierson (the Claimant) on the head as he worked for Marine Terminals Corporation (“MTC”) in 2001 caused brain damage. Following intensive treatment, in 2003 he returned to work, where he struggled for three and a half years with mental fatigue, short term memory problems and dizziness. He stopped working in 2006 when he was no longer able to sustain the extraordinary effort work demanded. This decision awards him permanent total disability compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Worker‘s Compensation Act (the Act).
MTC disputes the Claimant’s disability, or, alternatively, argues liability should pass to Willamette Stevedoring (“Willamette”) or Kinder Morgan instead, because the Complainant’s last days of work were with those employers. I reject these arguments. MTC owes the Claimant permanent total disability benefits and ongoing medical care. The ILWU-PMA Welfare Plan (“the Plan”), which intervened, has a valid lien on the Claimant’s disability compensation for reimbursement of disability benefits it provided to the Claimant, and MTC must reimburse the Plan for the medical care it provided the Claimant that MTC ought to have supplied.

Conclusion

The Claimant suffered compensable work-related injuries for which MTC is liable. He was temporarily totally disabled from June 26, 2001 until September 1, 2003, temporarily partially disabled from September 2, 2003 until December 3, 2006, temporarily totally disabled from December 4, 2006 to October 4, 2007, and then permanently totally disabled from October 5, 2007 forward.

CLAIMANT AWARDED TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS (ALJ AVERY)

ATOSHA C. JAMES V. HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED-PASCAGOULA OPERATIONS
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Excerpts

Claimant is 30 years old and has a GED.  She started working for Employer on October 18, 2006.  She began her career as a firewatcher, but by the time of her accident on September 1, 2010, she was a pipe fitter.  On September 1, 2010, Claimant fell and twisted her left ankle.  She was taken to an emergency room where she said she also complained of left-sided back pain but was told to discuss those complaints with Dr. Warfield, Employer’s resident physician.  She did so on September 2, 2010, and Employer’s Exhibit 1 is the accident report.  

Claimant testified she continued working but went back to the emergency room on September 5, 2010, complaining of back and side pain.  On September 8, 2010, she saw Dr. Stewart, who took her off work.  On September 9, 2010, Claimant returned twice to the emergency room with what she described as contraction-type pains and was operated on by Dr. Horn.  He found a twisted left ovary with a ruptured cyst, both of which he removed. Claimant is seeking temporary total disability from September 8, 2010, to October 28, 2010, when she reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and returned to work.  The ankle is healed, and what Claimant seeks is compensation while recovering from the surgery, plus medical expenses involved.   She also seeks future medical treatment because she will need hormone therapy.

Conclusion

The Employer is liable for all medical expenses which are the natural and unavoidable result of the work injury.   In order for medical expenses to be assessed against an employer, the expenses must be both reasonable and necessary.   Parnell v. Capitol Hill Masonry, 11 BRBS 532, 539 (1979).  The claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment  by showing a qualified physician deems the treatment necessary for the claimant’s work-related injury.   Turner v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 16 BRBS 255, 257-58 (1984).  When the employer or carrier learns of the claimant’s injury, it must authorize medical treatment by the claimant’s chosen physician.  Once the claimant has made her initial free choice of physician, she may change physicians only with prior written approval from his employer or carrier, or from the district director.  33 U.S.C. § 907(c). As stated above, I have found Claimant’s lower backside pain and ovary torsion compensable under the Act; the parties stipulated that Claimant’s ankle injury was caused by the workplace accident.  Therefore, I find Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary treatment for these conditions.  However, I found that the symptoms allegedly related to Claimant’s hormone changes after her oophorectomy are not compensable under the act.  Consequently, I find Claimant is not entitled to hormone treatment.